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ABSTRACT
There is a rich collection of literature that aims at protecting
the privacy of users querying location-based services. One
of the most popular location privacy techniques consists in
cloaking users’ locations such that k users appear as poten-
tial senders of a query, thus achieving k-anonymity. This pa-
per analyzes the effectiveness of k-anonymity approaches for
protecting location privacy in the presence of various types
of adversaries. The unraveling of the scheme unfolds the
inconsistency between its components, mainly the cloaking
mechanism and the k-anonymity metric. We show that con-
structing cloaking regions based on the users’ locations does
not reliably relate to location privacy, and argue that this
technique may even be detrimental to users’ location pri-
vacy. The uncovered flaws imply that existing k-anonymity
scheme is a tattered cloak for protecting location privacy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Security, Measurement
1. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of people own mobile devices with
positioning capabilities, and use various location-based ser-
vices (LBSs) to obtain all kinds of information about their
surroundings. Privacy concerns have emerged because many
of such services enable, by design, service providers to collect
detailed location information about their users.
Protecting users’ location privacy, while enabling them
to still benefit from location-based services, is a challenging
problem. The most popular technique for designing privacy-
preserving LBSs consists in obfuscating the actual location
from which a query is made by constructing cloaking regions
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that contain the locations of k anonymous users. According
to the k-anonymity metric, a user’s level of location privacy
directly depends on the number of other users that expose
their location to the LBS using the same cloaking region and
at the same time as the considered user does, while identity-
wise they are indistinguishable from each other. This ap-
proach is an adaptation of the k-anonymity technique orig-
inally developed in the context of database privacy [14],
to prevent the re-identification of anonymous people whose
data were included in a published dataset. Taking for granted
the effectiveness of the k-anonymity technique for protect-
ing location privacy, a large body of literature has focused
on maximizing its efficiency in a variety of system models.
In this paper, we provide a thorough security analysis of k-
anonymity schemes for location privacy considering various
adversaries, classified based on their knowledge. The unrav-
eling of the scheme shows multiple incoherences. First, there
is confusion about query anonymity and location privacy.
We show that cloaking can help decouple a query and a user
(query anonymity) but does not necessarily prevent the ad-
versary from linking a location to a user (location privacy).
Second, the absence of a clear adversary model in the secu-
rity analysis affects the validity of privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms. We show that given certain knowledge, the adversary
can obtain the location of users hiding behind the cloaking
regions. Finally, we show that k is not representative of the
actual location-privacy of mobile users. In fact, the cloak-
ing technique, constructed based on the k-anonymity met-
ric, may even be counterproductive and give the illusion of
a high location-privacy level, while the adversary is able to
infer the users’ locations.
The results of our analysis, that show the inconsistencies
of the k-anonymity metric with respect to the users’ actual
location-privacy at microscopic level, in addition to previ-
ous works that show the inaccuracy of k-anonymity metric
in reflecting the strength of mixing users’ trajectories (i.e.,
location privacy at macroscopic level) [17], suggest that the
k-anonymity scheme is inadequate for protecting location
privacy. These negative results on such a popular scheme
show that location privacy is not yet well understood and
that more attention is needed to address this problem.
2. LOCATION PRIVACY
In location-based services, users share their location with
a service provider in return for services. For example, many
LBSs enable users to search for nearby points of interests
(POIs). In such LBSs, users share their location with the
service provider at the time they need the information. This
is done by sending queries that include a user pseudonym,
her location (as the search domain of the query), and the
body of the query (e.g., what type of POI she is looking
for). The pseudonym of a user can be of different types
(explicitly given, such as her application username, or im-
plicitly inferable from the content of her packets such as
her IP address), each of which reveals different information
about the user’s real name. Permanent pseudonyms (that
do not change over time) make the user’s queries linkable to
each other, hence, eventually enabling re-identification.
In this model, the LBS provider is able to link users with
their visited locations, and thus is capable of inferring sen-
sitive private information. Malicious or incompetent service
providers are thus a threat to users’ location privacy. The
adversary may have prior information about the users’ per-
manent pseudonyms, the space in which users move, or their
mobility patterns, along with publicly available information
such as their homes and work places. This knowledge can
help the adversary to infer more information about users’ lo-
cations from their queries and to perform attacks that leads
to absence/presence disclosure of the users’ locations [16].
Following the terminology introduced in [16], location pri-
vacy is defined in two levels: microscopic and macroscopic.
Microscopic location privacy is defined as the users’ loca-
tion privacy on a small scale, i.e., corresponding to a single
query, and reflects how accurately the adversary can infer
the users’ locations after observing their individual queries,
given his a priori knowledge. Macroscopic location privacy
represents users’ privacy on a large scale, e.g., given multiple
(possibly correlated) queries from users as they move.
Multiple privacy-preserving mechanisms have been pro-
posed so far. Users may hide their current locations from
the adversary by abstaining from sending their queries to
the LBS for a short amount of time and anonymize their
queries by removing their real names and changing their
pseudonyms (e.g., mix zones [1]); they may obfuscate the
queries by decreasing the accuracy or precision of their lo-
cation/time (e.g., location perturbation [7], time perturba-
tion [11]); or they may add some dummy queries that are
indistinguishable from the real queries [3].
At both microscopic and macroscopic levels, many of the
protection mechanisms are based on anonymization and ob-
fuscation methods. Among them, k-anonymity scheme is by
far the most employed protection scheme for location pri-
vacy, mostly due to its simplicity [4, 6, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21].
Taking for granted the effectiveness of the k-anonymity tech-
nique in preserving location privacy, researchers have mainly
focused on adapting it to variants of the basic system model
and on improving its efficiency (i.e., minimizing the cost of
obfuscation on the system utility, while guaranteeing a k-
anonymity level for the users).
In this paper, we focus on analyzing k-anonymity for loca-
tion privacy at the microscopic level, as it has already been
proven ineffective at the macroscopic level [8, 17].
3. K-ANONYMITY
In this section, we introduce the original concept of k-
anonymity and its extension to the field of location privacy.
3.1 The Concept of k-anonymity
The concept of k-anonymity was originally proposed by
Samarati and Sweeney in the field of database privacy [13,
14, 18]. Databases are typically populated with person-
specific data entries such as names, birth date, and gender.
Many situations call for the release of these data. For ex-
ample, a medical database may need to be shared or made
public in order to study the incidence of diseases. When re-
leasing data, the privacy of the individuals who provided it
should be protected: database entries should not be linkable
to individuals. The mere removal of explicit identifiers, such
as individuals’ names, is insufficient because individuals can
be re-identified by linking their distinctive attributes (e.g.,
date of birth) to publicly available information. These sub-
sets of attributes are called quasi-identifiers because they
facilitate the indirect re-identification of individuals.
To overcome this problem, the approach of k-anonymity
suggests the suppression and generalization (obfuscation) of
quasi-identifiers to make an individual’s data entry indistin-
guishable from others. By definition [13, 14, 18], a database
provides k-anonymity if explicit identifiers are removed from
the database and, additionally, the quasi-identifiers of each
individual in the database cannot be distinguished from those
of at least k − 1 other individuals.
In essence, the concept of k-anonymity relies on a simple
protection mechanism: obfuscation. It then measures the
provided privacy with a single parameter k. The value k
determines the privacy protection in place: the larger the
k is, the higher the privacy protection is. Thus, it is this
tight coupling of the privacy preserving mechanism and the
metric that builds the k-anonymity scheme.
The k-anonymity model may fail, in some cases, to guar-
antee the privacy to the level that its metric promises. This
is because making the quasi-identifiers of a user identical to
those of k−1 other users does not reflect how and to what ex-
tent her sensitive information is hidden from the adversary,
e.g., all the k users might have cancer (considering disease
as sensitive information). Additional properties such as l-
diversity [10] and t-closeness [9] complement k-anonymity by
considering how the users’ sensitive information is different
and remote from that of other users with whom she shares
the same obfuscated quasi-identifiers.
3.2 k-anonymity for Location Privacy
In the context of location privacy, the k-anonymity met-
ric was initially adapted to measure microscopic location-
privacy by Gruteser and Grunwald [6]. In this model, each
query sent to the LBS (including the user’s pseudonym, her
position and the query time) is equivalent to one entry in
a database, and the location-time information in the query
serves as the quasi-identifier. In order to protect a user’s lo-
cation privacy using k-anonymity, each of her queries must
be indistinguishable from that of at least k − 1 other users.
To this end, the pseudonyms of these k users are removed
from their queries, and the location-time pair in their queries
is obfuscated to the same location-area and time-window,
large enough to contain the users’ actual locations.
The k-anonymity scheme for location privacy has become
very popular, mainly due to its simplicity. A large body
of research has focused on increasing the efficiency of k-
anonymity schemes and reducing their cost of query obfus-
cation [4, 12, 19, 20], extending the obfuscation method to
protect traces [2] (i.e., location privacy at the macroscopic
level), or adapting the architecture presented in [6] to dif-
ferent scenarios [15, 21].
All of these systems can be represented by the initial
model introduced in [6]. We present this model in Fig. 1:
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Figure 1: Basic k−anonymity model
There is a set of users who access a LBS through a trusted
Central Anonymity Server (CAS). Users send their LBS
queries 〈i, q, l, t〉 to the CAS, where i is the identity of the
user, q is her query, l is her precise location (expressed as a
point with coordinates (x, y) in a 2-dimensional space), and
t is the time at which the query is generated. In order to
protect users’ privacy, the CAS removes the identity i of the
users. Furthermore, it obfuscates the location l = (x, y) and
the time t at which the queries were generated. For this,
it constructs a cloaking region R = ([x1, x2], [y1, y2], [t1, t2])
such that there are at least k users (k = 3 in the figure) in R
whose location l = (x, y) at time t satisfies that x1 ≤ x ≤ x2,
y1 ≤ y ≤ y2, and t1 ≤ t ≤ t2.
We note that, decentralized approaches [15] can also be
represented by our model, by considering that the cloaking
region R is computed by a set of entities (e.g., users them-
selves) in a distributed manner (i.e., they collectively play
the role of the CAS). Moreover, our model can accommo-
date both the systems in which users have to continuously
report their location to the CAS [12], in order to build opti-
mal regions, and the systems that rely only on user-triggered
discrete queries for that purpose [4].
The k-anonymity location obfuscation technique aims at
achieving two properties: query anonymity and location pri-
vacy. Achieving query anonymity implies that it is not pos-
sible for the adversary to link the identity i of a user to
her query q, based on the location information (cloaking re-
gion) associated with the query. Location privacy is achieved
when it is not possible for the adversary to learn the loca-
tion l of a user i at time t, using queries he receives from
the users and his a priori knowledge.
We consider an adversary that controls the LBS and, in
addition to the received queries, has access to some back-
ground information. For example, one of the threats con-
sidered in [6] is “restricted space identification”. In this
threat scenario the adversary knows that a given location
corresponds (exclusively) to a user address, meaning that a
query coming from that precise location would be linked to
the user who resides at that address. Another considered
threat in [6] is that the adversary (in addition to controlling
the LBS) may deploy antennas in the vicinity of the users
and thus knows that a given user is in location l at time t.
4. EVALUATING K-ANONYMITY
This section evaluates the k-anonymity scheme with re-
spect to the properties stated previously: query anonymity
(i.e., concealing the link between user i and her query q) and
location privacy (i.e., concealing the link between user i and
her location l at time t). The evaluation is twofold: first,
we analyze the consistency of the k-anonymity metric over
time and space, and second, its coherence with the users’
location privacy given adversaries with different knowledge.
4.1 Consistency
Consider that the k users in the cloaking region of a given
user are situated next to each other in a small place (e.g., a
bar). In this case, the adversary learns the actual location
of the users (e.g., all of them are at the bar). In contrast,
consider a large cloaking region that encompasses the same
number of users. In this case, users’ location privacy is bet-
ter protected because the adversary has more uncertainty
about their exact locations. Hence, the number of users in
the obfuscated region is not a consistent metric for location
privacy. The independence of the value of k and the accu-
racy of a user’s location estimation by the adversary, implies
that k is irrelevant to their actual location privacy.
4.2 Adversarial Knowledge
A security analysis must define the knowledge of the ad-
versary by considering the information the adversary has
access to. We consider three types of background informa-
tion the adversary could have and examine which properties
are provided in each of the cases. The first and the third
type capture extreme scenarios: the worst case scenario (i.e.,
the adversary knows everything), and the ideal case sce-
nario (i.e., the adversary knows nothing). The second type
is generic and captures most realistic adversary models.
4.2.1 Real-Time Location Information
We first consider a scenario in which the adversary has ac-
cess to real-time information on the location of users. In this
case, as also mentioned in [6], the adversary could eavesdrop
on the communications between users and CAS, and localize
them (e.g., using multiple directional antennas) thus being
able to obtain the location from which users send queries.
Upon receiving a query 〈q,R〉 in which k users are present,
the LBS may not distinguish which of the k users is the
sender of query q. Thus, the originator of the query is at
best k-anonymous. However, as the adversary knows the
users’ exact location they have no location privacy.
4.2.2 Statistical Information
Let us now consider an adversary who is unaware of the
real-time position of users, but who has access to statistical
information about their mobility patterns. For example, the
adversary may have access to publicly available information
on users’ homes and work places [5] and knows that, with a
high probability, users will be at home during the night, and
at their work places during office hours. As the adversary
does not have access to the actual location of users, to per-
form an attack he only relies on the queries 〈q,R〉 forwarded
by the CAS and the available background information.
In this case, the success of the adversary in pinpointing
users’ actual locations in the obfuscated regions depends
only on his statistical background information. Thus, we
argue that computing cloaking regions based on actual lo-
cations does not necessarily improve users’ location privacy
and hence is neither efficient nor effective. Let us consider
a neighborhood as the one shown in Fig. 2(a), and assume
that the adversary knows that with a high probability all
users are at home (for instance, late in the evening). When
user A sends a query 〈q,R〉 to the LBS, it is unaware of
the current location of users, and can only use the available
statistical information to infer who/where is the sender of
q. Thus, user A is 4−anonymous independently of whether
or not B, C, and D are currently using the system, or even
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Figure 2: Statistical background information: effi-
ciency (a) and additional information (b)
present at their home locations. Therefore, there is no need
for the CAS to execute complex algorithms (e.g., [4, 12]) to
compute or select the region R on-the-fly. Instead, regions
R can be pre-computed (taking into account the background
information available to the adversary) and later be selected
by users uniquely based on their own location, regardless of
whether or not k−1 other users are currently in the vicinity.
Further, computing cloaking regions based on the users’
current locations can be counterproductive. In order to op-
timize the accuracy of LBS, previous proposals aim at min-
imizing the area of the region R in the query. When R is
computed according to the current location of users, this
minimization allows the adversary to make inferences about
their current position (as there must be at least k users in
the region). Consider the example in Fig. 2(b) in which only
users A, B, E, and F are active (i.e., using the system), and
assume that the adversary has the same information as in
the previous case. When user A sends a query, the CAS for-
wards 〈q,R′〉 to the LBS. Upon receiving this information,
the adversary learns that A, B, E, and F are currently in
their home locations, and that C and D are either inactive
or absent. This is because had C and D been active in the
system, the minimal region sent to the LBS would have been
R (as in Fig. 2(a)). Thus, the only configuration that results
in R′ is that A, B, E, and F are active and at home. In
this case, although the query q is still 4−anonymous, A, B,
E, and F have no location privacy, due to the information
revealed to the adversary by the cloaking region itself.
4.2.3 No Information
Finally, we consider an adversary that does not (and will
not) have any background information. Assuming that the
only information available to the adversary is the queries
forwarded by the CAS, both query anonymity and location
privacy are achieved by simply removing the users’ identities
from their queries. Thus, in this case, constructing cloak-
ing regions based on the k-anonymity technique does not
provide any additional protection and it only reduces the
performance of the system in terms of accuracy and com-
putational load. Given the availability of public location in-
formation, this is an unrealistically weak adversary model,
included here for the sake of completeness.
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